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A FLAWED ASSUMPTION: WHY THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR VETERANS CLAIMS SHOULD ABANDON ITS PRESUMPTION
AGAINST THE CERTIFICATION OF CLASS ACTIONS
Matthew D. Handley*
I. INTRODUCTION
After twenty years, the United States’ longest-running military
conflict has finally drawn to a close with the withdrawal of U.S. troops
from Afghanistan.1 The veterans who first deployed in support of
combat operations in Afghanistan had to—literally in some cases—
hand the fighting off to their children.2 Those veterans now look to the
country that sent them into combat to provide them with care and
compensation for the wounds they incurred. Two hundred thousand
veterans of the post-9/11 era are now leaving the military each year3
and many of them will seek to access the host of veterans4 benefits
offered by various state and federal agencies—most notably those
offered by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Some of those
veterans will find little difficulty obtaining health care, housing,
disability compensation, educational assistance, and a wide range of
other benefits offered to them by the VA in thanks for their service.
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.A. The University of
Oklahoma; B.A. Cedarville University. I would like to express my sincere thanks to my
faculty advisor, Professor Katherine Moore, for her support, guidance, and
encouragement, and to my editor, Mikayla Berliner, for her meticulous and insightful
feedback.
1 Adam Nossiter and Eric Schmitt, U.S. War in Afghanistan Ends as Final Evacuation
Flights Depart, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/30/
world/asia/afghanistan-us-occupation-ends.html.
2 J.P. Lawrence & Philip W. Wellman, Years After They Fought in Afghanistan, US
Troops Watch as Their Children Deploy to Same War, STARS & STRIPES (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.stripes.com/news/years-after-they-fought-in-afghanistan-us-troopswatch-as-their-children-deploy-to-the-same-war-1.647659#.
3 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-438R, TRANSITIONING SERVICEMEMBERS:
INFORMATION ON MILITARY EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE CENTERS 1 (2019), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-19-438r.pdf.
4 The use of the word “veterans” as an attributive noun—written without the
apostrophe that would typically indicate a plural possessive noun—is a term of art in
the field of veterans benefits which this Comment will employ where appropriate. See,
e.g., Which Is Correct: Veterans Day or Veteran’s Day?, THESAURUS.COM, https://www.
thesaurus.com/e/grammar/veterans-day-grammar/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2021).
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Some, however, will receive denial letters rejecting their claims for
benefits and be forced to wade through an administrative and judicial
appeals process complicated by inexorably long processing times,5
repeated remands,6 and the litigation of complex issues of law and fact
often without the assistance of counsel.7
Countless veterans face these substantial burdens in litigating their
claims for benefits through the administrative and judicial system. The
VA estimates that there are now 20.3 million living veterans in the
United States.8 The largest, by far, of the many VA-administered benefits
programs available to those veterans is service-connected disability
compensation.9 Under this program, veterans are entitled to receive a
monthly compensation check and free or low-cost medical treatment for
any injury or disease incurred as a result of their military service.10 Only
about 4.9 million veterans currently receive this service-connected

5 See Hugh B. McClean, Delay, Deny, Wait Till They Die: Balancing Veterans’ Rights
and Non-Adversarial Procedures in the VA Disability Benefits System, 72 SMU L. REV. 277,
284 (2019) (showing that it can take up to nine years from the time of initial filing to
fully litigate a claim through the administrative and judicial appellate process); see also
Monk v. Wilkie, 30 Vet. App. 167, 185 (2018) (Allen, J., concurring in part) (comparing
the delays faced by veterans seeking VA benefits to the plight of the litigants in Charles
Dickens’ fictional case Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, which had been “pending for so long that
‘[i]nnumerable children have been born into the cause; innumerable young people have
married into it; innumerable old people have died out of it . . . [and] a long procession of
Chancellors has come in and gone out’”), aff’d, 978 F.3d 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
6 See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS. BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR
2020, at 37 (2020),
https://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2020AR.pdf [hereinafter
BVA 2020 REPORT] (showing that in fiscal year 2020, the Board of Veterans Appeals
granted 33.8% of legacy appeals and remanded 40.6%, and granted 37.0% of
modernized appeals and remanded 28.2%); see also U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS
CLAIMS, FISCAL YEAR 2020 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2020), http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/
documents/FY2020AnnualReport.pdf [hereinafter CAVC 2020 REPORT] (showing that
80.7% of appeals were remanded either in whole or in part).
7 See BVA 2020 REPORT, supra note 6, at 36 (showing that 39.4% of veterans whose
legacy appeals were remanded and 29.2% of those whose legacy appeals were denied
at the Board were unrepresented); see also CAVC 2020 REPORT, supra note 6, at 1
(showing that twenty-three percent of veterans were pro se at the time of filing appeals
and twelve percent remained pro se by the time of disposition).
8 NAT’L CTR. FOR VETERANS ANALYSIS & STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., VETERAN
POPULATION PROJECTION MODEL 2018: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION 4 (2018), https://www.va.gov/
vetdata/docs/Demographics/New_Vetpop_Model/VP_18_A_Brief_Description.pdf (last
updated Aug. 5, 2020).
9 Disability compensation represents over $95 billion of the agency’s
approximately $114 billion in annual benefits outlays. See VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S.
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., ANNUAL BENEFITS REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 7 (2019), https://
www.benefits.va.gov/REPORTS/abr/docs/2019-abr-v2.pdf#
[hereinafter
2019
BENEFITS REPORT].
10 38 U.S.C. § 1110; see also 38 C.F.R. § 17.36(b) (2019).
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disability compensation.11 Each year the VA processes over a million
new claims by veterans seeking new or increased disability
compensation benefits,12 but only grants those benefits to a small
percentage of claimants.13 When the VA denies a veteran’s claim, that
veteran must wade into the morass of the VA’s administrative appeals
process, and often ends up waiting years to gain access to much-needed
health care and disability benefits while their claims move through the
system.14
Long wait times, claims backlogs, and disparate outcomes are not
problems unique to the VA. Many of the administrative agencies that
are responsible for adjudicatory functions suffer from similar
challenges.15
A handful of agencies have experimented with
mechanisms that could speed up claim processing and improve the
quality and consistency of adjudication by aggregating similar claims.16
But the veterans claims adjudication system, like most of the
administrative state, has historically resisted the implementation of
“tools used by courts to efficiently resolve large groups of claims, like
class actions and other complex litigation procedures.”17
For some veterans seeking administrative and judicial review
when their claims are denied, the issues they must litigate are unique to
the factual circumstances of their service and medical history and would
not be appropriate for aggregate resolution.18 For others, however, the
2019 BENEFITS REPORT, supra note 9, at 8.
See News Release, VA Continues Record Setting Claims Processing Pace for 2019,
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS. OFF. OF PUB. AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFS., (Dec. 9, 2019), https://
www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=5371 (showing that the VA processed
1.44 million new claims in 2019).
13 2019 BENEFITS REPORT, supra note 9, at 8 (showing that the VA granted 309,091
new claims in 2019).
14 See McClean, supra note 5 at 283–84; see also Veterans for Common Sense v.
Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 878
(9th Cir. 2011) (characterizing these adjudicatory delays as a deprivation of health care
that constitutes a due process violation); Neil Eisner, 2003 A.B.A. SEC. ADMIN. L. & REGUL.
PRAC. REP. 3 (2003) [hereinafter ABA REPORT], https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/directories/policy/2003_my_102.authcheckdam.pdf (“[I]t is not uncommon
for a veteran seeking disability compensation for an illness to die before that person’s
claim can be resolved.”).
15 Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action, 126
YALE L.J. 1634, 1637 (2017) (noting similar issues “[a]cross the administrative state”).
16 See, e.g., id. at 1641–42 (describing aggregate resolution procedures employed by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program, and the Office for Medicare Hearings and Appeals).
17 See id. at 1640, 1654.
18 See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2019) (“Service connection connotes many factors . . . . Each
disabling condition . . . must be considered on the basis of the places, types and
circumstances of his service as shown by service records, the official history of each
11
12
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VA may have denied their claims based on regulations or adjudication
procedures that apply to entire categories of similarly situated veterans
and bar them from benefits. For example, veterans returning from Iraq
and Afghanistan discovered that—despite being exposed to “burn pits”
and breathing in the fumes given off by burning batteries, paint,
solvents, coolants, electronics, and a host of other toxic materials—the
VA did not presume they had a toxic exposure.19 Instead, the VA placed
the burden on the veteran to produce scientific evidence of the toxicity
of those burn pits and medical evidence linking the exposure to their
conditions.20 Vietnam veterans spent years fighting the VA’s unfair
regulatory presumption that every veteran who physically set foot on
the soil or inland waters of Vietnam was exposed to Agent Orange,
whereas veterans exposed on the ships and planes that actually carried
it had to provide proof of that exposure.21
Prior to the enactment of the Veterans Judicial Review Act (VJRA)
in 1989, veterans were able to bring class-action lawsuits in federal
district courts to challenge regulations or adjudicative policies that
precluded entire classes of veterans from obtaining benefits.22
Following the passage of the VJRA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims (CAVC) became the exclusive avenue for judicial review of all VA

organization in which he served, his medical records and all pertinent medical and lay
evidence.”).
19 See Alex Horton, Jon Stewart Urges Health-Care Law for Veterans Exposed to Toxic
Burn Pits, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nationalsecurity/2020/09/15/jon-stewart-burn-pits-veterans/; see also Steve Beynon, VA Has
Denied About 78% of Disability Claims from Burn Pits, STARS & STRIPES (Sept. 23, 2020),
https://www.stripes.com/news/veterans/va-has-denied-about-78-of-disabilityclaims-from-burn-pits-1.646181.
20 See Alex Horton, Jon Stewart Urges Health-Care Law for Veterans Exposed to Toxic
Burn Pits, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/09/15/jon-stewart-burn-pits-veterans/.
21 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, BLUE WATER NAVY VIETNAM
VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE EXPOSURE 1–2, Nat’l Acad. Press 2011, https://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/books/NBK209599/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK209599.pdf. See Section III.A, infra, of
this Comment for further discussion of Haas v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 257, 259
(2006), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
22 See, e.g., Robison v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 848, 851 (D. Mass. 1973) (certifying a
class of selective service registrants who had satisfactorily completed alternative
civilian service and were denied veterans educational benefits), rev’d, 415 U.S. 361
(1974); Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 440 F. Supp. 811, 814 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (certifying
a class of veterans enrolled in a weekend college program who had been denied fulltime educational benefits), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 590 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1978);
Giusti-Bravo v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 853 F. Supp. 34, 35, 42 (D.P.R. 1993) (approving a
stipulated class settlement pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) by a class of veterans from
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands).
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benefits-related claims.23 The CAVC almost immediately began rejecting
petitions to certify class actions because it believed that its ability as an
appellate court to render a binding, precedential decision to a single
litigant made class actions unnecessary.24
This Comment will examine the CAVC’s long-held view of itself
primarily as an appellate court akin to the federal circuit courts of
appeal that issue precedential decisions. It will then show how that
view has led to the development and codification of a rebuttable
presumption against certifying class actions based on the flawed
assumption that the court’s ability to issue a precedential decision
makes class actions unnecessary. Finally, this Comment will argue that
the presumption against the certification of class actions should be
abandoned. Part II will explain how veterans benefits claims are
litigated through the administrative agency process and explore the
factors that led to the creation of the CAVC as a level of judicial review
over veterans’ claims. Part III will trace the CAVC’s repeated rejections
of requests for class action certification from the time the court was
created by the VJRA in 1989 through the decision by the Federal Circuit
in 2017 which held that the CAVC must entertain requests to certify
class actions. It will also examine how the CAVC reacted to the Federal
Circuit’s decision by adopting the rebuttable presumption against class
action certification. Part V will show that the CAVC’s ability to issue
precedential decisions is nominal at best and complicated by numerous
practical limitations. It will argue that the rebuttable presumption
against the certification of class actions is based on a flawed premise and
should be abandoned by the CAVC.

23 Michael P. Allen, The Youngest Federal Court: The United States Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 4 (“The court has exclusive jurisdiction to
review decisions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals.”).
24 See, e.g., Harrison v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 438, 438 (1991); Lefkowitz v.
Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 439, 440 (1991).
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II. BACKGROUND OF VETERANS CLAIMS AND THE CREATION OF THE CAVC
In order to seek disability compensation benefits, a veteran must
file a claim with the VA online, by mail, or in-person.25 The veteran then
receives an initial administrative decision from one of the VA’s fifty-six
regional offices.26 If the veteran disagrees with the decision, they may
request a higher-level review by a senior adjudicator or appeal to the
agency’s internal Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA).27 A veteran who
appeals their initial decision under the BVA’s traditional “legacy” appeal
system waits an average of 1,583 days for a decision on that appeal.28
That wait time includes an estimated average of 523 days waiting on
internal agency remands.29 Prior to 1989, once the BVA (or the internal
review mechanisms of the VA’s predecessor agencies)30 rendered a final
decision on an individual claim, a veteran had no recourse beyond the
agency.31 In 1989, succumbing to pressure from numerous veterans
groups, Congress passed the Veterans Judicial Review Act, which
created the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC).32 The
CAVC is an Article I court33 with the jurisdiction to review final decisions
25 See How to File a VA Disability Claim, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS.,
https://www.va.gov/disability/how-to-file-claim/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2021). Veterans
can also seek the assistance of an accredited service organization for assistance with
filing their claim. Get Help Filing Your Claim or Appeal, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS.,
https://www.va.gov/disability/get-help-filing-claim/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
26 See About VBA, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., https://www.benefits.va.gov/
BENEFITS/about.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
27 38 C.F.R. § 3.2500 (2019).
28 See BVA 2020 REPORT, supra note 6, at 30. The BVA is gradually transitioning from
their legacy appeals system to a “modernized” appeals system. But as of the most recent
published data, most appeals are still being processed under the legacy system, and it
remains to be seen whether wait times in the modernized system will be substantially
different. Id. at 32.
29 Id. at 30.
30 Before the VA was created in 1921, veterans benefits were administered, at
different points, by the Department of War, the Department of the Interior, and the
Treasury. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., VA HISTORY IN BRIEF 3–8, https://www.va.gov/opa/
publications/archives/docs/history_in_brief.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
31 Prior to the passage of the VJRA, it was the view of Congress that there should be
no judicial review of individual veterans benefits decisions. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-963,
at 9 (1988), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5790 (“[O]ver the years, the Congress
has declared its views that there should be no judicial remedy with respect to claims for
veterans benefits, and this policy was honored for nearly 170 years.”).
32 See Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 301(a), 102 Stat.
4105, 4113 (1988). Congress initially named the court the United States Court of
Veterans Appeals until they renamed it in the Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-368, § 511(b), 112 Stat. 3315, 3341 (1998).
33 An “Article I court” is a specialized subject-matter tribunal created by Congress to
administer and adjudicate specific federal benefits and programs. Article I courts are
considered “non-judicial” because they are not part of the judicial branch created by
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of the BVA.34 Now a veteran who disagrees with a BVA decision can
petition the CAVC for judicial review of that decision.35 The decisions of
the CAVC on questions of law are appealable to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.36
The CAVC generally renders a decision on a veteran’s case in one of
two ways. The court can elect to have the case heard by a single judge,
who then issues an unpublished, non-precedential decision.37
Alternatively, the court can hear the case before a panel of no less than
three judges, which issues a published, precedential decision.38 A singlejudge decision resolves the case for the individual claimant, sometimes
affirming, denying, or modifying the agency’s decision, or remanding
back to the agency.39 The court views these single-judge, nonprecedential decisions as a time-saving tool, appropriate for cases “of
relative simplicity” which—in the court’s view—do not present novel or
important questions of law.40
Because the CAVC is one of the busiest federal appellate courts,41 it
relies on its ability to issue these unpublished, single-judge opinions to
manage its overwhelming caseload.42 The court uses an initial screening
process to identify cases that a single-judge can quickly dispose of
Article III of the U.S. Constitution. As is true with the CAVC, the decisions of many Article
I courts are appealable to Article III courts. See Understanding the Federal Courts, ADMIN.
OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. 3, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/understandingfederal-courts.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
34 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251–52.
35 See 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a).
36 Id. § 7292(a), (c).
37 Id. § 7254(b); see also Allen, supra, note 23, at 5 (“The great majority of the court’s
work is done through
these single judge memoranda decisions, which are non-precedential.”).
38 38 U.S.C. §7254(b); see also Allen, supra note 23, at 5 (noting that “[o]n rare
occasions” the entire CAVC will sit and render a decision “as an en banc court,” but panels
generally consist of three judges).
39 See 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a).
40 See Frankel v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 23, 25–26 (1990) (adopting a six-factor test
to screen for cases appropriate for panel disposition); see also Internal Operating
Procedures, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS 1–2 [hereinafter CAVC Internal
Operating
Procedures],
https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/IOPJuly19_
2019.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
41 Allen, supra note 23, at 5 (“The court is a busy place. It consistently ranks in the
top two or three federal appellate courts in terms of cases per judge . . . . And I should
add that our caseload is rising.”); see also CAVC 2020 REPORT, supra note 6, at 8 (“The
Court received 1,322 filings per active judge . . . in FY 2020. The number of filings per
active judge for the Circuit Courts of appeals ranged from 81 to 443.”).
42 Victoria Hadfield Moshiashwili, Ending the Second “Splendid Isolation”? Veterans
Law at the Federal Circuit in 2013, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 1437, 1467 (2014) (“[I]t is only by
using its statutory ability to issue such non-precedential decisions that the court is able
to manage such an overwhelming workload.”); see also Frankel, 1 Vet. App. at 26.
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without the extensive briefing and oral argument typically required by
a panel decision.43 Notably, the determination of whether a panel will
decide a case can involve “a personal or telephone conference between
a [CAVC] staff attorney and the parties,”44 potentially giving represented
parties an advantage over pro se veterans in strategizing and seeking
precedential review where it may be desirable.
Ultimately,
approximately ninety-nine percent of cases at the CAVC that reach a
final disposition by either a judge or a panel are decided by a single
judge.45 Of the 8,954 appeals that were initially filed with the CAVC in
FY 2020, only 0.5% reached a final disposition by a panel, the rest being
resolved either by a single judge or otherwise dismissed or withdrawn,
often by agreement of the parties.46
Because of the need to manage their caseload, and because these
single-judge decisions only affect the veteran before the court, the
judges who issue them often do not go to great lengths to explain the
law being applied.47 The same “screening judge” who determines that
the case does not warrant panel consideration writes the decision,48
often without any oral argument or even full briefing.49
Additionally, anywhere from one-third to half of all CAVC decisions
involve remanding the case back to the VA.50 This process of repeated
remands, both at the agency level and at the CAVC, along with short,
thinly-reasoned opinions that do not bind the VA in any other cases,
places veterans as a community in a “hamster wheel” of adjudications.51
43 Frankel, 1 Vet. App. at 26 (“In anticipation of a heavy case load the Court has
implemented a case management system with a central legal staff assigned to evaluate
the cases as soon as issues are identified and relative simplicity or complexity can be
determined.”).
44 Id.; see also CAVC Internal Operating Procedures, supra note 40, at 1.
45 See CAVC 2020 REPORT, supra note 6, at 2 (showing that of 2,581 cases that
proceeded to a decision by the court, 2,433 were decided by a single judge).
46 Id. at 1–2.
47 Moshiashwili, supra note 42, at 1467.
48 CAVC Internal Operating Procedures, supra note 40, at 2.
49 See Frankel v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 23, 26 (1990) (noting that one of the
advantages of the screening process is that it “make[s] it possible to treat a considerable
number of cases without full briefing and oral argument”); see also CAVC Internal
Operating Procedures, supra note 40, at 2 (“A request for oral argument generally is not
granted for cases deemed appropriate for single-judge disposition.”).
50 See James D. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?: A Comparative Analysis of
Appellate Review by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 1 VETERANS L.
REV. 113, 153 (2009); see also CAVC 2020 REPORT, supra note 6, at 3 (showing that, out of
8,430 appeals, 2,259 were wholly remanded and 4,552 were remanded either in whole
or in part in addition to other relief).
51 See Coburn v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 427, 434 (2006) (Lance, J., dissenting)
(describing the habit of repeated remands for further development as “perpetuat[ing]
the hamster-wheel reputation of veterans law”); see also McClean, supra note 5, at 283
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Commentators have traditionally applied the “hamster wheel” analogy
to describe the plight of individual veterans who get stuck litigating
their claims through the system.52 But when entire groups of similarly
situated veterans must repeatedly litigate the same issues and often
receive no more than a non-binding, non-precedential decision, entire
classes of veterans remain stuck in the hamster wheel repeatedly and
unnecessarily litigating the same issues.
A panel’s precedential decision does, in theory, bind the VA,
potentially in a manner that would be favorable to other similarly
situated claimants. But precedential decisions are exceedingly rare, and
the CAVC issues some to veterans who are unrepresented by counsel.53
Attorneys represent the VA in every case, but pro se veterans may not
be capable of fully briefing their positions or otherwise advocating for
their best interests without counsel.54 Represented veterans with
meritorious legal positions, which may have led to a precedential
decision, may instead resolve their dispute with the VA at the predisposition conference, whereas a pro se veteran generally does not
have the opportunity to do so.55 The VA also frequently endeavors to
settle or otherwise moot cases that are scheduled for precedential
review.56 Additionally, once a precedential decision is issued, there is
no requirement that the VA notify similarly situated veterans a decision
that may be beneficial to them.57
(“The procedure for claiming and appealing benefits has been likened to a hamster
wheel because veterans’ claims are developed, denied, appealed, and remanded ad
infinitum.”).
52 See id.
53 See CAVC 2020 REPORT, supra note 6, at 1 (showing that twenty-three percent of
veterans were pro se at the time of filing appeals and twelve percent of appeals
remained pro se by the time of disposition); see also Lawrence B. Hagel & Michael P.
Horan, Five Years Under the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act: The VA Is Brought Kicking and
Screaming into the World of Meaningful Due Process, 46 ME. L. REV. 43, 64 (1994)
(“[T]here is a need for more trained advocates, knowledgeable in the law of veterans’
benefits. Many of the court’s precedential opinions have been issued with the veteran
appearing pro se.”).
54 See Hagel & Horan, supra note 53, at 64 (“The adversary model of dispute
resolution depends for success on two relatively equally matched parties arguing their
points with full force. The VA is fully represented in every case.”).
55 See CAVC Internal Operating Procedures, supra note 40, at 1 (noting that court staff
will generally hold a conference with represented parties to “discuss the issues and
encourage joint resolution of the appeal” whereas pre-disposition conferences with pro
se veterans are generally confined to “matters other than the merits of the appeal”).
56 See Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
57 Hagel & Horan, supra note 53, at 65 (“[T]he VA is under no duty to identify those
veterans and make them whole. It is, rather, up to the individual veteran to discover the
court’s precedent and ask for a readjudication of his or her case based upon that decision
and a claim of clear and unmistakable error.”).
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Given these concerns, after the passage of the VJRA, legal scholars
began to propose that the CAVC adopt a mechanism that is expressly
designed to benefit large groups of claimants who are similarly situated
and may face difficulty litigating their claim individually—the class
action.58 The class action mechanism has several key features which
make it an attractive option for adjudicating large volumes of claims.59
First, it can improve the likelihood that claimants are able to be
represented by competent counsel because a large class action may
attract attorneys willing to represent the class where a lone claimant
could not afford to retain counsel.60 Second, class actions encourage
more efficient adjudication of claims, particularly when those claims are
factually and legally similar.61 Finally, class action adjudication
encourages the “uniform application of law” by treating similarly
situated claimants in a consistent manner.62
Despite these potential benefits, the CAVC repeatedly rejected the
creation of a class action mechanism for the first twenty-eight years of
its existence, reasoning that entertaining class actions would be a
violation of the court’s jurisdictional statutes,63 as well as inappropriate
and unnecessary for an appellate court that was capable of issuing
precedential decisions.64 As of 2017, the CAVC stood alone as the only

58 Id. (“Another question that may receive consideration in the future is whether the
court should hear class action suits as a possible mechanism to compel correction of a
systemic error.”); see also ABA REPORT, supra note 14, at 7 (recommending that Congress
“authorize the CAVC to certify class actions” because “the lack of this procedure is unfair
to many veterans”).
59 See Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 1649–50.
60 Id. at 1649 (citing Adam S. Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 DUKE L.J. 1105,
1115 (2010) (“Class certification is thought to enable litigation when damages are too
small for individuals to justify the high costs of retaining counsel.”)).
61 Id. at 1650 (citing 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1.9
(5th ed. 2015) (“Class actions are particularly efficient when . . . the courts are flooded
with repetitive claims involving common issues.”)).
62 Id.; see also Ebanks v. Shulkin, 877 F.3d 1037, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (reasoning
that systemic issues that affect large groups of veterans are “best addressed in the classaction context, where the court could consider class-wide relief”).
63 See Am. Legion v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 1, 8 (2007) (“Congress has expressly
limited our jurisdiction to addressing only appeals and petitions brought by individual
claimants.”); see also Monk v. McDonald, No. 15-1280, 2015 WL 3407451, at *3 (Vet.
App. May 27, 2015) (“[The appellant] fails to appreciate the Court’s long-standing
declaration that it does not have the authority to entertain class actions.”), rev’d and
remanded sub nom. Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
64 See Lefkowitz v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 439, 440 (1991) (holding that “such a
procedure is unnecessary in light of the binding effect of this Court’s published opinions
as precedent in pending and future cases”); see also Harrison v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App.
438, 438 (1991) (holding the same); Monk, 2015 WL 3407451, at *3 (“[T]o do so would
be both unwise and unnecessary.”) (citation omitted).
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non-Article III court to conclude that it lacked the authority to entertain
class actions.65
Then, in a 2017 case which became known as “Monk II,” the Federal
Circuit overturned nearly three decades of CAVC precedent and held
that the CAVC did have the authority to entertain class actions in the
context of petitions for writs of mandamus under the All Writs Act
(AWA).66 Two years later, in Skaar v. Wilkie, the CAVC itself held that it
had even broader authority to entertain class actions which aggregated
individual appeals of BVA decisions, even where some members of the
class did not have final decisions.67 Allowing class actions at the CAVC
represented a monumental shift and opened new avenues of litigation
for veterans and advocates.68
The CAVC, however, has always viewed its ability as an appellate
court to issue precedential decisions as inherently superior to the class
action vehicle.69 In that vein, in Skaar v. Wilkie—one of the first major
cases where a claimant requested class certification arising from the
appeal of an individual benefits decision following Monk II—the CAVC
went beyond the traditional requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 23”).70 The court held that all litigants
must also overcome a rebuttable presumption that a precedential
decision on the individual case of the proposed class representative
would be superior to the certification of a class action.71 On November
10, 2020, the court officially codified this presumption as part of a set of
newly published revisions to their Rules of Practice and Procedure.72
The CAVC based its decision to add a rebuttable presumption
against the certification of class actions on the arguably questionable
premise that their “ability to render binding precedential decisions will
ordinarily be adequate.”73 As this Comment will demonstrate below, not
only are precedential decisions vanishingly rare, but they suffer from
limitations such as lack of notice, inadequate representation of veterans
throughout the entire claims adjudication process, and failures on the
Sant’ Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 1654.
Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
67 Skaar v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 156, 184–85 (2019).
68 See Monk v. Wilkie, 30 Vet. App. 167, 184 (2018) (Davis, J., concurring) (“This
holding is a seismic shift in our precedent, departing from nearly 30 years of this Court’s
case law.”), aff’d, Monk v. Wilkie, 978 F.3d 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
69 See Skaar, 32 Vet. App. at 196.
70 Id.
71 Id. (citation omitted).
72 Order, In Re: Rules of Practice and Procedure, Misc. No. 12-20 (Vet. App. Nov. 10,
2020), https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/MiscOrder12-20.pdf.
73 Skaar, 32 Vet. App. at 196.
65
66
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part of the VA to adhere to the court’s decisions. The presumption
against the certification of class actions also puts the CAVC out of step
with the rest of the federal court system and places an unnecessary
hurdle in the path of veterans.
III. TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAVC’S REJECTION OF CLASS ACTIONS
Prior to the passage of the VJRA, veterans had been able to pursue
class actions in federal district courts against the VA for the denial of
benefits. Courts evaluated certification of those classes by the wellknown standards of Rule 23 and treated them much like any other class
action.74 In Nehmer v. U.S. Veterans’ Administration, a pre-VJRA case, a
class of veterans who had been exposed to the herbicide dioxin during
their military service challenged a VA regulation that recognized only a
single dioxin-related skin condition—chloracne—as compensable.75
The district court recognized that the only relevant considerations in
determining whether to certify a class were the requirements of Rule
23.76 The court found that the requirements were met and certified the
class.77 Considering cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
ultimately invalidated the regulation and placed a moratorium on
further denials.78 The parties reached a stipulated settlement as a result
of the litigation that was eventually codified in VA regulations and
remains a part of VA claims adjudication guidance to this day.79
Once Congress enacted the VJRA in 1989, the CAVC became the
exclusive forum for judicial review of VA benefits claims and veterans
lost the ability to bring similar class actions before the CAVC.80 Until the
74 See, e.g., Robison v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 848, 851 (D. Mass. 1973) (certifying a
class of selective service registrants who had satisfactorily completed alternative
civilian service and were denied veterans educational benefits), rev’d, 415 U.S. 361
(1974); Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 440 F. Supp. 811, 814 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (certifying
a class of veterans enrolled in a weekend college program who had been denied fulltime educational benefits), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 590 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1978);
Giusti-Bravo v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 853 F. Supp. 34, 42 (D.P.R. 1993) (approving a
stipulated class settlement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) by a class of veterans from
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands).
75 Nehmer v. U.S. Veterans’ Admin., 118 F.R.D. 113, 115–16 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
76 Id. at 116 (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974)).
77 Id. at 125.
78 Nehmer v. U.S. Veterans’ Admin., 712 F. Supp. 1404, 1423 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
79 See 38 C.F.R. § 3.816(a) (2019).
80 See Legislative Hearing on H.R. 761, H.R. 2243, H.R. 3485, H.R. 3544, and Draft
Legislation Before the H. Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Mem’l Affs. of the Comm.
on Veterans’ Affs., 111th Cong. 47 (2009) (statement of Barton F. Stichman, Joint
Executive Director, National Veterans Legal Services Program) (“[T]he ability of a
veteran or veterans organization to file a class action ended with the VJRA.”) (citing
Lefkowitz v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 439 (1991)).
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Federal Circuit’s landmark decision in Monk II in 2017, the CAVC held
firm to the idea that it was categorically prohibited from entertaining
class actions by its jurisdictional statute. The court also repeatedly
expressed the view that class actions would be unnecessary due to its
ability to issue binding precedential decisions. After Monk II, the CAVC
had to grapple with how it would handle the certification of class actions
and how its pre-Monk II jurisprudence would be impacted by the
Federal Circuit’s decision. Section A below will explore the development
of the CAVC’s stance towards class actions in the Pre-Monk II era.
Section B will explore the landmark Monk II decision, and how the
Federal Circuit’s reasoning began to reshape the class action landscape
at the CAVC. Section C will examine the CAVC’s decision in Skaar v.
Wilkie and the codification of the rebuttable presumption against the
certification of class actions.
A. The CAVC in the Pre-Monk II Era
After the VJRA established the CAVC, the court first considered its
authority to establish a class action procedure in two cases decided on
the same day: Harrison v. Derwinski, and Lefkowitz v. Derwinski. At the
time, it was not clear whether Congress—in conferring exclusive
jurisdiction over veterans claims on the CAVC—intended for veterans to
be able to continue to bring class actions before the CAVC as they had
previously in federal district courts.81 The CAVC had to determine
whether Congress intended to grant it such authority; in two short,
virtually identical, per curiam opinions, the court held that it did not
have such authority and denied both appellants’ petitions to establish a
class action procedure.82
The court’s opinions in both cases were grounded primarily in a
three-part plain-text interpretation of its jurisdictional statutes.83 First,
the court looked to 38 U.S.C. § 7252, which expressly limits the
jurisdiction of the CAVC to reviewing decisions of the BVA.84 Next, the
court pointed out that 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c) prohibits it from holding trials
de novo.85 Finally, the court noted that 38 U.S.C. § 7266 requires that
each individual aggrieved by a BVA decision file an individual notice of

81 Id. (“When Congress enacted the [VJRA] in 1988, it inadvertently erected a
significant roadblock to justice. . . . Congress failed to address clearly the authority of the
CAVC and the Federal Circuit to certify a case as a class action.”).
82 Lefkowitz v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 439, 440 (1991); Harrison v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.
App. 438, 438–39 (1991).
83 See Harrison, 1 Vet. App. at 438–39; Lefkowitz, 1 Vet. App. at 440.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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appeal.86 With these three statutes read together, the court believed it
“lack[ed] the power to adopt a rule” for class actions because it was
limited to hearing only appeals from individual veterans who had
received a final BVA decision and filed a notice of appeal where the court
could rule on the closed administrative record.87
The opinions also stated, without any elaboration, that a class
action procedure “in this appellate court would be highly
unmanageable,” without addressing the fact that there was no longer a
non-appellate forum where veterans would be able to bring class action
claims.88 Finally, the court stated that class actions were “unnecessary
in light of” the CAVC’s ability to issue binding, precedential opinions.89
In a concurrence in Harrison, Judge Kramer posited that the court
might have the power to aggregate claims if every claimant met the
jurisdictional requirements.90 Hence, under this proposed approach, a
class could be formed by a group of veterans who had all fully litigated
their appeals up through the BVA and received a final decision. Judge
Kramer also gave the first indication of a willingness to consider class
actions under the All Writs Act.91 Judge Kramer stated that “the Court
may have the power to entertain class actions” under the AWA “in
appropriate situations,” but did not indicate what those situations might
be.92
The CAVC next addressed the scope of its jurisdictional statutes
and whether there were any avenues for claim aggregation in American
Legion v. Nicholson.93 Although the plaintiff was not explicitly
attempting to certify a class action, the court took the opportunity to
more fully explain the view that its jurisdictional statutes strictly
confined it to hearing only individual appeals.94 Judge Hagel would
eventually cite American Legion, alongside Harrison and Lefkowitz, in

Id.
See id.
88 Id.
89 Harrison, 1 Vet. App. at 438–39; Lefkowitz, 1 Vet. App. at 440.
90 Harrison, 1 Vet. App. at 439 (Kramer, J., concurring).
91 The All Writs Act allows “all courts established by Act of Congress” to “issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. §
1651(a). The AWA was intended to give Article I courts flexible powers to create
procedural tools to aid them in the performance of their duties. See Price v. Johnston,
334 U.S. 266, 282 (1948) (referring to the AWA as “a legislatively approved source of
procedural instruments designed to achieve ‘the rational ends of law’”).
92 Harrison, 1 Vet. App. at 439 (Kramer, J., concurring).
93 See American Legion v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 1 (2007).
94 See Am. Legion v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 1, 4 (2007).
86
87
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the denial of class certification that led to Monk II.95 Here, the American
Legion did not attempt to certify a class action but rather sought a writ
of mandamus directing the VA to stay adjudication on a class of claims
brought by “blue water” Vietnam veterans96 seeking compensation for
diseases related to their exposure to defoliating herbicides.97 Perhaps
dissuaded by the existing precedent on class actions, the American
Legion instead argued that it had associational standing on behalf of all
the blue water Vietnam veterans and asked the CAVC for a writ of
mandamus to resume VA processing of blue water herbicide claims
pending the resolution of the appeal of Haas v. Nicholson.98
In Haas, an individual Vietnam veteran had appealed a decision by
the BVA denying him service-connected disability benefits for
conditions that he alleged were caused by his exposure to Agent Orange
while aboard naval ships in the offshore waters around Vietnam.99 The
VA denied Mr. Haas’s claim because he did not “set foot on land in the
Republic of Vietnam” and the VA could not, therefore, presume that he
had actually been exposed to Agent Orange.100 A three-judge panel
heard Haas and concluded that the VA’s interpretation of the regulation
was unlawful and that veterans who had served in the waters near
Vietnam were entitled to a presumption of exposure.101
The decision in Haas was, on its face, a monumental win for blue
water Vietnam veterans who had fought for decades to obtain disability
benefits for the injuries they suffered as a result of being exposed to
Agent Orange and other defoliating herbicides.102 As a precedential
95 See Monk v. McDonald, No. 15-1280, 2015 WL 3407451, at *3 (Vet. App. May 27,
2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
96 A “blue water” veteran is a servicemember who served on a ship in the open
waters surrounding Vietnam but did not set foot on shore. See Blue Water Navy Veterans
and Agent Orange Exposure, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., https://www.publichealth.va.
gov/exposures/agentorange/locations/blue-water-veterans.asp (last visited Oct. 8,
2021).
97 Am. Legion, 21 Vet. App. at 2.
98 Id. at 2–3; see also Haas v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 257 (2006). An association may
have standing to bring a suit on behalf of its members, even where there is no injury to
the association itself, “when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in
their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s
purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the
participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
99 Haas v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 257, 258–59 (2006), rev’d and remanded sub
nom. Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
100 Id. at 259.
101 Id. at 273.
102 See Rory E. Riley-Topping, Presumptive Benefits to Blue Water Navy Veterans are
a Major Win, THE HILL (Jan. 30, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/
427600-presumptive-benefits-to-blue-water-navy-veterans-are-a-major-win.
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decision, Haas should have, by law, bound the VA to presume exposure
for all of the other thousands of blue water veterans.103
Rather than implement this new precedent, the Chairman of the
BVA issued a memorandum, at the direction of the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, halting the adjudication of all claims for disability compensation
based on offshore herbicide exposure.104 Instead of allowing the many
blue water veterans with pending claims and appeals to benefit from the
CAVC’s precedential decision, the VA simply stopped processing their
claims while it appealed the Haas decision to the Federal Circuit.105
To allow these veterans to benefit from Mr. Haas’s win and the
precedential decision issued by the CAVC, the American Legion sought a
writ of mandamus directing the VA to resume processing claims in
accordance with the Haas decision.106 Perhaps seeing an alternative
avenue in Judge Kramer’s dissents in Harrison and Lefkowitz, the
American Legion also argued that the CAVC had jurisdiction to hear its
associational claim on behalf of its members, pursuant to the AWA.107
Judge Greene wrote the majority opinion, joined by Judges
Moorman, Lance, and Davis.108 The court concluded that 38 U.S.C. §§
7252(a) and 7266(a) limited its jurisdiction to decisions of the BVA
brought by “a person adversely affected” and indicated that the plain
meaning of the statutes leans towards the interpretation that a “person”
is an individual.109
The majority also discussed the legislative history of the VJRA. It
concluded that Congress did not intend the CAVC to go beyond hearing
individual claims by veterans who had received final decisions from the
VA.110 In the majority’s view, the proper role of Veterans Service
Organizations like the American Legion should be representing and
assisting individual claimants in bringing their appeals rather than
bringing aggregated claims on behalf of their members as a whole.111
The majority also addressed the idea of jurisdiction for aggregated
claims under the AWA.112 The court concluded that the AWA is limited
to writs “in aid of” the CAVC’s jurisdiction, and since its jurisdiction is

103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(1)-(2).
Am. Legion v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 1, 2 (2007).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3, 7.
Id. at 2, 9, 11–12.
Id. at 4.
Am. Legion, 21 Vet. App. at 4–5.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7–8; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
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limited to individual claims, so too are writs in aid of such jurisdiction.113
In the majority’s view, Congress had “impose[d] a prudential limitation”
upon the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over claims made only by
individuals.114
In a dissent, Judge Kasold argued that while the CAVC’s appellate
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing individual board decisions, the court
possesses independent authority under the AWA to grant
“extraordinary relief” in aid of that jurisdiction.115 Judge Kasold also
took the position that the legislative history cited by the majority was
inapplicable to the situation at hand because none of it directly
addressed the question of associational standing in the context of the
AWA.116
In a separate dissent, Judge Hagel argued that a writ of mandamus
under the AWA is appropriate because it is not dependent on the
individual circumstances of the American Legion’s members and would
apply uniformly to all members.117 Judge Hagel “strongly agree[d]” that
the focus of the court should be on individual claims and emphasized
that “very limited circumstances . . . would support” associational
standing.118
During the same period that the court was rendering these
decisions—holding that its authorizing statute prevented it from
entertaining class actions and associational standing claims—the court
was also actively resisting legislative reforms that would have amended
the VJRA to grant it such authority. The Veterans Appellate Review
Modernization Act was draft legislation proposed in 2009 that would
have, among other things, explicitly granted the CAVC the jurisdiction to
entertain class actions and adopted Rule 23 as the framework for
certification.119 Judge Kasold appeared at committee hearings on the bill
and opposed those provisions on behalf of the court, saying that “we
don’t see the need for such explicit authority” and stating—somewhat
at odds with the court’s published decisions on the matter—that “it is

Am. Legion, 21 Vet. App. at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
115 Id. at 9 (Kasold, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 10–11.
117 Id. at 11 (Hagel, J., dissenting).
118 Am. Legion, 21 Vet. App. at 11–12.
119 Legislative Hearing on H.R. 761, H.R. 2243, H.R. 3485, H.R. 3544, and Draft
Legislation Before the H. Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Mem’l Affairs of the Comm.
on Veterans’ Affairs, 111th Cong. 2, 43 (2009). Portions of this draft legislation were
ultimately introduced as the Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of
2009, H.R. 4121, 111th Cong. (2009).
113
114
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not clear that we don’t already have the authority.”120 Judge Kasold
seemed to hold open the possibility that the court did, in fact, have the
authority to certify class actions and took the position that the holding
in Lefkowitz was that class actions were simply unnecessary—not that
they were, as a rule, beyond the court’s authority.121 Ultimately the
grant of class action authority was dropped from the final version of the
legislation.122
In 2011, the now-Chief Judge Kasold appeared before the
committee again and opposed certain provisions of H.R. 1484, the
Veterans Appeals Improvement Act of 2011, arguing that class actions
were not needed due to the court’s ability to issue precedential
decisions.123 The initial draft of the bill included the creation of a
commission to study whether the CAVC “should have the authority to
hear class action or associational standing cases.”124 Chief Judge Kasold
argued to the committee that class actions were unnecessary because
the court’s published cases were “totally binding on the [VA],” and that
if an individual veteran secured a win on a particular issue, the VA
“would then take action” on all other veterans’ claims in accordance
with that decision.125 After Judge Kasold’s testimony, Congress dropped
the creation of the commission from the bill.126
The first step on the road towards the court’s eventual acceptance
of class actions came in 2015 when the CAVC first heard the case of
Vietnam veteran Conley Monk and rendered a decision that came to be
known as “Monk I.”127 In 2015, Mr. Monk brought a petition for a writ of
120 Id. at 9. Judge Kasold appeared on behalf of then-Chief Judge William P. Green,
who was “unable to attend.” Id. at 42.
121 Id. at 43.
122 Compare Legislative Hearing on H.R. 761, H.R. 2243, H.R. 3485, H.R. 3544, and Draft
Legislation Before the H. Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Mem’l Affairs of the Comm.
on Veterans’ Affairs, 111th Cong. 9 (2009) (describing the sections of the draft legislation
as including the creation of a commission, a grant of class action authority, and
provisions on the assignments of error), with Veterans Appeals Improvement and
Modernization Act of 2009, H.R. 4121, 111th Cong. §§ 3, 4 (2009) (incorporating the
provisions on assignment of error and the creation of a commission).
123 Legislative Hearing on H.R. 811, H.R. 1407, H.R. 1441, H.R. 1484, H.R. 1627, H.R.
1647, and H. Con. Res. 12 Before the H. Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Mem’l Affairs
of the Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 112th Cong. 19–21 (2011).
124 Veterans Appeals Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 1484, 112th Cong. §3 (as
introduced in the House, Apr. 12, 2011).
125 Legislative Hearing on H.R. 811, H.R. 1407, H.R. 1441, H.R. 1484, H.R. 1627, H.R.
1647, and H. Con. Res. 12 Before the H. Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Mem’l Affairs
of the Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 112th Cong. 21 (2011).
126 See Veterans Appeals Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 1484, 112th Cong. (as
referred to Senate committee, June 6, 2011).
127 See Monk v. Tran, No. 2020-1305, 2021 WL 244309, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 2021)
(referring to the decision as “Monk I”).
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mandamus before the CAVC challenging the VA’s “pervasive and
unlawful delay[s] in adjudicating” the appeals of disability benefits
claims.128 Mr. Monk had filed a claim for benefits that was denied, and
he appealed the denial of that claim to the BVA in July of 2013.129 At the
time of his petition to the CAVC in May of 2015, his appeal had been
pending before the BVA for 20 months, and nearly three years had
elapsed since the filing of the initial claim.130 Mr. Monk asked that the
CAVC issue a writ of mandamus and “compel the Secretary promptly to
decide his claim and that of thousands of similarly situated veterans.”131
Mr. Monk alleged that the VA’s failure to respond to his appeal for over
20 months “amounted a constructive denial of benefits.”132
Mr. Monk’s petition recognized that the CAVC had previously
declined to adopt class action or aggregate procedures.133 He took the
position that the court possessed the authority under the AWA to
establish a class action procedure.134 Mr. Monk argued that, “[f]or
practical and policy reasons,” the court should use its inherent
rulemaking authority to create a class action mechanism.135 He cited a
law review article written by Judge Hagel before joining the court, in
which Hagel acknowledged that class actions may be a necessary tool at
the CAVC to “compel correction” of the types of “systemic error[s]” by
the VA that would be untenable for individual veterans to litigate oneby-one.136
Judge Hagel decided Monk I in a non-precedential opinion.137 Judge
Hagel summarily rejected the possibility of a class action based on the
binding precedent established by the en banc court in Lefkowitz,
Harrison, and American Legion.138 In the face of that binding precedent,
Judge Hagel concluded that the CAVC lacked the authority to certify a
class action and that “[in] the absence of such authority, no other
arguments matter.”139

Monk v. McDonald, No. 15-1280, 2015 WL 3407451, at *1 (Vet. App. May 27,
2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
129 Monk, 2015 WL 3407451, at *1.
130 Id.
131 Id. at *2.
132 Id. at *1.
133 Id. at *2.
134 Monk, 2015 WL 3407451, at *1–2.
135 Id. at *2.
136 Id.; see also Hagel & Horan, supra note 53, at 65.
137 Monk, 2015 WL 3407451, at *1.
138 Id. at *3.
139 Id.
128
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B. Monk II: The Federal Circuit Upends Three Decades of CAVC
Precedent
Conley Monk appealed the CAVC’s denial of his petition for class
certification to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and their
groundbreaking decision came to be known as “Monk II.”140 The Federal
Circuit had previously seemed to agree—or at least declined to
disagree—with the CAVC in two non-precedential decisions holding
that the CAVC lacked the authority to certify class actions but had never
squarely ruled on the issue in a precedential decision.141 But in a sudden
reversal of nearly thirty years of CAVC precedent in Monk II, the Federal
Circuit overruled the CAVC’s Monk I decision and held that the CAVC did,
in fact, have the authority to certify class actions and develop
procedures for the aggregation of claims.142
Circuit Judge Reyna, writing for the unanimous three-judge panel,
rebutted each of the lines of reasoning previously used by the CAVC to
reject class actions. Judge Reyna pointed out that veterans were able to
bring class actions prior to the VJRA and noted that—although the
legislative history indicated an intent for the CAVC to focus on individual
claims—there was nothing in the legislative history showing that
Congress intended to explicitly remove or preclude veterans’ ability to
bring class actions at the CAVC when they had previously been able to
bring them in federal district courts.143
Judge Reyna then examined the CAVC’s narrow reading of its
jurisdictional statutes, which it first applied in Lefkowitz and Harrison,
and concluded that such a strict interpretation of the statutes was
misguided.144 The Federal Circuit reminded the CAVC that its
overarching statutory mandate codified in the VJRA was to “compel
action of the Secretary unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”145
It reasoned that this explicit grant of authority to compel such action,
and the attendant authority to “prescribe rules of practice and
procedure” also explicitly granted by Congress to achieve that end,
overrode the CAVC’s narrow view of its own jurisdiction based on their
overly technical combination of § 7252, § 7261(c), and § 7266.146
140 Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Monk v. Tran, No.
2020-1305, 2021 WL 244309, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 2021) (referring to the decision as
“Monk II”).
141 See Monk, 855 F.3d at 1321 n.7 (citing Spain v. Principi, 18 Fed. App’x. 784, 786
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Adeyi v. McDonald, 606 F. App’x 1002, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
142 Monk, 855 F.3d at 1318, 1321.
143 Id. at 1319.
144 Id. at 1320.
145 Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(2)).
146 Id.
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The Federal Circuit also validated Judge Kassold’s dissent in
American Legion by clarifying that the CAVC’s authority under the AWA
is not limited to the strict jurisdictional boundaries that apply to
individual appeals but is a “legislatively approved . . . instrument[]” that
broadly empowers the CAVC to achieve equity and “fill gaps in their
judicial power.”147
Judge Reyna also highlighted a number of compelling policy
rationales for the adoption of a class action mechanism at the CAVC and
why such a procedure would “promot[e] efficiency, consistency, and
fairness, and improv[e] access to legal and expert assistance by parties
with limited resources.”148 First, Judge Reyna noted that “case law is
replete” with examples of the VA dodging the effect of judicial review by
acting swiftly to moot individual mandamus petitions just before the
CAVC could rule on them and reasoned that a class action mechanism
would help put an end to this practice.149 Judge Reyna also pointed out
that the VA uses similar tactics—mooting individual cases that are
scheduled for precedential review—to evade unfavorable precedential
decisions.150
The Federal Circuit also called out the CAVC on its extremely low
number of precedential decisions each year and opined that perhaps
class actions would enable the CAVC to “consistently adjudicate cases by
increasing its prospects” of issuing binding opinions.151 Amicus curiae
briefs highlighted the inconsistency of CAVC adjudications as a major
factor for consideration. In one brief cited in Judge Reyna’s opinion, a
group of former General Counsels for the VA argued that “the CAVC’s
practice of disposing of cases on a piecemeal basis undermines the
precedential value of its decisions.”152 These amici pointed out that the
CAVC utilizes the “narrowest possible grounds policy” to dispose of a
case by remanding it back to the BVA as soon as a single error—legal or
factual—is identified.153 As a result of this policy, the CAVC’s decisions
147 Id. at 1318; see also Am. Legion v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 1, 9 (2007) (Kasold, J.,
dissenting).
148 Monk, 855 F.3d at 1320.
149 Id. at 1320–21 (citing Young v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 201, 215 (2012); Seller v.
McDonald, No. 16-2768, 2016 WL 5828055, at *2 (Vet. App. Sept. 30, 2016); Dotson v.
McDonald, No. 16-2813, 2016 WL 5335437, at *1 (Vet. App. Sept. 23, 2016); Dalpiaz v.
McDonald, No. 16-2602, 2016 WL 4702423, at *1 (Vet. App. Sept. 8, 2016)).
150 Monk, 855 F.3d at 1321 (citing Brief for Am. Legion et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellant at 18–25).
151 Id.
152 Brief for Former Gen. Couns. of the Dep’t of Veterans Affairs as Amicus Curiae at
17, Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (No. 15-7092), 2015 WL 9311513.
153 Id. at 17–18 (citing Best v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 18, 19-20 (2001); Mahl v. Principi,
15 Vet. App. 37, 38 (2001)).
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routinely “dispose of cases raising the same legal issue on entirely
different grounds, never reaching the common question of law.”154
The Federal Circuit concluded that there is “no reason” the CAVC
cannot adjudicate class actions because the CAVC is “no different in this
respect from, for example, the EEOC or bankruptcy courts.”155 This
comparison of the CAVC to the EEOC and bankruptcy courts severely
undercuts the CAVC’s long-held view of itself primarily as an appellate
court issuing precedential decisions.156 It seemed to belie a sense on the
Federal Circuit that the CAVC is more properly viewed as a part of the
Article I administrative adjudication system than it is an appellate court
akin to the Federal Circuit itself and the other Article III circuit courts of
appeal.157
Following the Federal Circuit’s decision, Mr. Monk returned to the
CAVC, and it formally recognized its authority to certify a class action in
the mandamus context but ultimately decided not to certify Mr. Monk’s
proposed class.158 Recognizing that it would likely adopt formal rules to
govern class action certification at some point in the future, the court
decided that it would use Rule 23 as a guide in the interim.159 The court
applied the well-known factors of Rule 23(a)—numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy—and the requirement that a
class action fall within one of the subcategories of Rule 23(b).160

Id. at 18.
Monk, 855 F.3d at 1321.
156 U.S. bankruptcy courts are subsidiary to the federal district courts and exercise
jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters only by referral from the district court, which can
be withdrawn at any time. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a); 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), (d). Class actions at
the EEOC are conducted through an internal agency process and adjudicated by
administrative judges. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.204 (2020). An amicus brief filed by fifteen law
professors pointed out to the Federal Circuit that many other Article I “administrative
courts of appeal” use methods of case aggregation to consolidate cases, such as the
“Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, the HHS Departmental Appeals Board, the
Department of Agriculture, OMHA, and the Environmental Appeals Board.” Corrected
Amicus Brief and Appendix of 15 Administrative Law, Civil Procedure, and Federal
Courts Professors in Support of Appellant and Reversal at 15, Monk v. McDonald, No. 151280, 2015 WL 3407451 (Vet. App. May 27, 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Monk
v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (No. 15-7092), 2015 WL 8485190.
157 See Veterans’ Disability Compensation: Forging a Path Forward: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 111th Cong. 36 (2009) (Statement of Prof. Michael P. Allen)
(“[T]here is at times an unusual tension between the Veterans Court and the Federal
Circuit . . . [O]ne cannot read the opinions of these bodies without being left with the firm
conviction that there are occasions on which each court displays a certain lack of respect
for the other . . . [T]his tension is a product of the current structure of judicial review.”).
158 Monk v. Wilkie, 30 Vet. App. 167, 181 (2018), aff’d, No. 2019-1094, 2020 WL
6141013 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 20, 2020).
159 Id. at 170.
160 Id. at 174; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
154
155
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Ultimately, the court held that Mr. Monk’s proposed class did not satisfy
the requirement of commonality.161 Notably, however, the court did not
add an additional presumption against class actions, and Judge Allen
even took time in a concurrence to commend the plurality’s adoption of
the Rule 23 framework as “wise[]” given its “long history in the Federal
courts.”162 Judge Allen also made a point to remind the court that
although individual precedential decisions bind the VA, they are small
in number and difficult for individual claimants to enforce.163
After Monk II, the notion that precedential decisions make
certification of class actions unnecessary began to resurface in the
CAVC’s response to two motions for class certification decided in 2019:
Godsey v. Wilkie and Wolfe v. Wilkie.164 In both cases, after evaluating the
proposed classes under the standard Rule 23(a) factors, the court
elected to evaluate the “superiority” of a class action in a manner
analogous to a 23(b)(3) claim, despite acknowledging that the parties
were seeking the certification of what would normally be a 23(b)(2)
class.165 Both decisions acknowledged the burden of obtaining and
enforcing individual precedential decisions.166 But by electing to go
through the analysis of superiority where Rule 23 would not ordinarily
require it, the court began to resurrect the fundamental assumption
from Harrison and Lefkowitz that the question of class certification must
begin with the assumption that a precedential panel decision is
generally preferable.167 This assumption also contained within it a
deeper, unstated, and flawed premise—discussed more fully below—
that enforceable precedential decisions are an option that is realistically
available to most individual veterans.

Monk, 30 Vet. App. at 181.
Id. at 188 (Allen, J., concurring in part).
163 Id. at 200.
164 See Godsey v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 207 (2019); Wolfe v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 1
(2019).
165 Godsey v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 207, 224 (2019); Wolfe v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 1, 32–
33 (2019).
166 See Godsey, 31 Vet. App. at 224 (“[D]eciding this petition as a class empowers the
Court to monitor and enforce its order more easily and efficiently than would be possible
through the filing of individual petitions seeking compliance in each claimant’s case.”);
see also Wolfe, 32 Vet. App. at 33 (“To force class members to proceed through the
normal appellate process individually would amount to a monumental waste of agency
and judicial resources in a system already rife with delay.”).
167 See discussion supra Section III.A.
161
162
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C. The CAVC Gives and Takes Away: Skaar v. Wilkie
In 1966, a U.S. Air Force bomber carrying four nuclear warheads
collided with a refueling tanker in the airspace over Palomares, Spain.168
Emergency parachutes on two of the warheads failed to deploy and they
impacted the ground at high speed, causing them to explode in subnuclear detonations that scattered radioactive plutonium across the
Spanish countryside.169 Approximately 1,600 U.S. servicemembers—
most low-ranking Air Force personnel with no specialized training in
radioactive cleanup—were sent to clean up the debris with little to no
protective gear, each spending anywhere from several weeks to several
months exposed to the plutonium.170 Many of these servicemembers
developed cancers, blood disorders, cardiovascular conditions, and
other diseases, but the VA denied their applications for disability
compensation.171 The Air Force had collected data on the plutonium
levels at the cleanup site, but the VA decided to discard that data because
it showed levels of exposure that the VA assumed were inaccurate
because they were so high.172 Then, after having discarded the data
showing levels of exposure that would have substantiated the
Palomares veterans’ claims, the VA denied them disability benefits.173
One of the Air Force veterans who spent years litigating his claim
for benefits through the VA brought a petition to the CAVC for class
certification on behalf of the Palomares veterans.174 Although the CAVC
had recently granted class action certifications in the context of
petitions for a writ of mandamus in Wolfe and Godsey, this was the first
time the CAVC considered whether to grant class certification in the
context of aggregating the appeals of the merits of multiple individual
BVA decisions.175 In a move described as “herald[ing] the beginning of
an era,” the court held that it would entertain class actions outside of the
Skaar v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 156, 167 (2019).
Id. at 168.
170 Dave Phillips, Legal Win is Too Late for Many Who Got Cancer After Nuclear CleanUp, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/11/us/palomaresair-force-nuclear.html; Dave Collins, Case Over 1966 US Bomb Accident in Spain Goes
Before Court, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/
case-over-1966-us-bomb-accident-in-spain-goes-before-court/2020/09/02/
b8b62f60-ed4f-11ea-bd08-1b10132b458f_story.html.
171 Collins, supra note 170.
172 Id.; see also Skaar, 32 Vet. App. at 169 (“[R]ecorded urine dose intakes for
Palomares veterans ‘seemed unreasonably high’ compared to ‘environmental
measurements’ derived from air sampling some 15 years after the cleanup . . . .”).
173 Collins, supra note 170.
174 Skaar, 32 Vet. App. at 170.
175 Id. at 166 (“The issue we confront here—class certification in the context of an
appeal of an individual Board decision—is one of first impression.”).
168
169
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context of petitions for a writ of mandamus and allow the aggregation
of individual benefits appeals.176
The court proceeded to evaluate the merits of Mr. Skaar’s petition
for class certification and concluded that the petition satisfied all the
requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2).177 It then went on to add a
rebuttable presumption against certifying class actions.178 Writing for
the majority, Judge Allen relied on the long-standing notion that the
court’s ability to issue precedential decisions was inherently superior to
certification of a class action.179 The court held that, in addition to all
the usual Rule 23 requirements, the court will “presume class actions
should not be certified” unless a claimant can demonstrate that a class
action is “superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.”180 In justifying the presumption, Judge
Allen drew upon the superiority language from Rule 23(b)(3) but did
not use the actual 23(b)(3) factors and applied the presumption against
certification to all types of class actions.181
Judge Allen also made a point to strike back at the Federal Circuit’s
comparison of the CAVC to the EEOC and bankruptcy courts and the
arguments by amici in Monk II comparing the court to administrative
agency appeals boards, writing that “to our knowledge, we are the only
appellate body in the Nation with the authority to aggregate actions in
the first instance.”182 It is clear from this language that the CAVC does
not see itself as akin to an administrative agency appeals board or a
bankruptcy court—as it is well-established that those bodies do have
the ability to aggregate183—but as an appellate court akin to the federal
circuit courts of appeal.

176 Id. at 200–01. Notably, the VA has appealed the class certification decisions in
both Skaar and Wolfe to the Federal Circuit on jurisdictional grounds, seeking to
substantially limit the CAVC’s authority to certify classes arising from both writs and
appeals. See Brief of Respondent-Appellant at 21, Skaar v. McDonough, Nos. 2021-1757
and 2021-1812 (Fed. Cir. Jul. 16, 2020); Brief for Respondent-Appellant at 26, Wolfe v.
Wilkie, No. 2020-1958 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 19, 2020).
177 Skaar, 32 Vet. App. at 194.
178 Id. at 196 (“[W]e will presume classes should not be certified because our ability
to render binding precedential decisions ordinarily will be adequate. Claimants seeking
class certification can rebut this presumption . . . .”).
179 Id.
180 Id. at 172.
181 Id. at 196–97.
182 Id. at 195.
183 See Corrected Amicus Brief and Appendix of 15 Administrative Law, Civil
Procedure, and Federal Courts Professors in Support of Appellant and Reversal at 15,
Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (No. 15-7092), 2015 WL 8485190 at
*15.
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The Skaar decision established four factors that claimants can
demonstrate to rebut the presumption against certifying class
actions.184 The presumption can be overcome by showing that (1) the
claims are directed at the policy itself; (2) litigation of the challenge
involves compiling a complex factual record; (3) the record is
sufficiently complete for adjudication; and (4) there is a need for
remedial, class-wide enforcement.185 A full discussion of the merits of
each of these factors would exceed the scope of this Comment and would
go beyond the basic and fundamental flaw that underlies the
presumption against the certification of class actions—the court’s longstanding commitment to viewing itself primarily as an appellate court
routinely issuing precedential panel decisions that make class actions
unnecessary. In reality, the vast majority of the court’s work consists of
single judges disposing of the claims of individual litigants as quickly
and efficiently as possible.
In crafting these factors, the court did identify some practical
limitations that can make class actions difficult to manage and that, in
certain cases, “render the class action format inappropriate for a
particular suit.”186 Judge Allen pointed to decisions where class actions
were held to be unmanageable because (1) individual class members’
claims were governed by disparate sets of state laws, (2)
communicating with a large class and providing the required notice and
opt-out rights was too difficult, and (3) the claims of the class members
“required too many individualized determinations.”187
These
manageability concerns present in other federal courts are largely
inapplicable at the CAVC, particularly once the requirements of Rule 23
have been met. Federal statutes and regulations govern all claims
brought before the CAVC, and the commonality and typicality
requirements of Rule 23 already ensure that classes are only certified
where they present a common question of law and when resolution of
the class claims can be accomplished by the adjudication of the claims
of the class representative.188 The VA is also uniquely positioned to
provide effective notice to veterans, as they maintain access to vast
databases of veteran contact information.189
Skaar, 32 Vet. App. at 197–98.
Id.
186 See Skaar, 32 Vet. App. at 196 (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156,
164 (1974)).
187 Id. at 196–97 (internal citations omitted).
188 Id. at 192.
189 Maria Souden, Acting Dir., VA Info. Res. Ctr., Overview of VA Data, Information
Systems, National Databases and Research Uses (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.hsrd.
research.va.gov/for_researchers/cyber_seminars/archives/3694-notes.pdf
(noting
184
185
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The CAVC has rendered relatively few decisions on class
certification since it formally implemented the rebuttable presumption
in Skaar,190 so it remains to be seen how difficult it will be for claimants
to use the four factors to rebut the presumption against certification.
Some of the decisions that have been rendered, however, are already
demonstrating the court’s propensity to summarily reject class
certification based on their long-standing assumption that their
precedential decisions are an available and enforceable remedy for
most veterans.191 In a recent decision on two consolidated cases, the
court rejected both veterans’ claims on the merits but also elected, in the
alternative, to deny their motions for class certification.192 Writing for
the panel, Chief Judge Bartley stated that the claimants had not
demonstrated that there was “a need for remedial enforcement . . .
because a binding precedential decision would be adequate to provide
relief to any valid prospective class members.”193 The court presumed
that if the claimants were successful in challenging the validity of the
regulation at issue, the VA would “immediately implement [that]
precedential decision,” and Judge Bartley dismissed any possibility of
VA non-compliance as “hypothetical” and “unlikely.”194
The CAVC recently granted class certification for only the fourth
time in its history195 in Beaudette v. McDonough.196 The petitioners in
Beaudette challenged the VA’s interpretation of 38 U.S.C. § 1720G as

that the VA maintains the “largest integrated healthcare system” database in the
country, with 20 years of data on 9 million veterans). Federal records custodians also
maintain the last known home address of every single veteran upon separation from the
military. DD Form 214, Discharge Papers and Separation Documents, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/personnel-records-center/dd-214.
190 See CAVC 2020 REPORT, supra note 6, at 7 (“Over the course of FY 2020 . . . the Court
received four requests for class certification and class action, and certified two classes.”).
191 See Bowling v. McDonough, No. 18-5263, 2021 U.S. App. Vet. Claims. LEXIS 513, at
*3 (Mar. 29, 2021) (“[I]f we were to decide the class action motion, we would deny it
because appellants have not rebutted the presumption that a precedential decision
would be adequate.”). The court consolidated Appling v. McDonough, No. 19-0602, with
Bowling and rendered a decision on class certification in both cases in the same decision.
Id. at *2.
192 Id. at *10.
193 Id. at *12 (quoting Skaar v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 156, 197 (2019)).
194 Id. at *16 (first quoting Skaar, 32 Vet. App. at 198; then quoting Ward v. Wilkie, 31
Vet. App. 233, 242 (2019)).
195 The CAVC has previously certified classes in Godsey v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 207
(2019), Wolfe v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 1 (2019), and Skaar v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 156
(2019).
196 Beaudette v. McDonough, No. 20-4961, 2021 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 671 (Apr.
19, 2021).
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insulating its determinations under the Caregivers Program197 from any
form of appellate review by either the BVA or the judiciary.198 The court
held that the “unique circumstances [of the] case warrant[ed] classwide relief.”199 Because the VA had denied claimants any form of
meaningful appellate review for so long, the CAVC reasoned that the
“centralized relief” afforded by a class action was necessary to remedy
the issue.200 The CAVC briefly analyzed each of the first three Skaar
factors, noting that none are “more or less important than the others.”201
Then, the court spent the bulk of its Skaar analysis on the final factor
stating that “[m]ost importantly . . . a precedential decision would not
effectively inform past program claimants of their appellate rights or
ensure that VA honored them.”202
In the future, the CAVC may apply one of the first three Skaar
factors to reject class actions due to more practical concerns such as
complexity or the lack of a well-developed record.203 But the court’s
class action jurisprudence up to this point, and its early decisions
applying the rebuttable presumption against certification, indicate that
its primary focus remains centered on using the fourth factor—the
enforcement factor—to determine whether its nominal ability to render
a precedential decision renders the certification of a class action
unnecessary.
IV. THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION AGAINST THE CERTIFICATION OF CLASS
ACTIONS SHOULD BE ABANDONED BY THE CAVC
The problem with the CAVC’s presumption against the certification
of class actions is that it is fundamentally rooted in a flawed premise—
that the alternative to certification of a class action is a precedential
decision. Practically, the odds are quite low that any given veteran will
be able to obtain a precedential decision where their legal position was
thoroughly briefed, argued by competent counsel, and notice of that
decision was then disseminated to all affected veterans and
scrupulously adhered to by the VA. Logically, it does not make sense to
presume that courts should deny the certification of class actions where
197 Congress established the Program of Comprehensive Assistance for Family
Caregivers (Caregiver Program) to provide certain VA benefits to family members who
deliver in-home personal care services to seriously disabled veterans. See Beaudette v.
McDonough, No. 20-4961, 2021 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 671, at *1–2 (Apr. 19, 2021).
198 Id. at *1.
199 Id. at *22.
200 Id. at *23.
201 Id. at *21.
202 Id. at *23 (emphasis added).
203 See Skaar v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 156, 197–98 (2019).
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only a mere possibility exists that a putative class claimant may one day
obtain a published, precedential decision in an appellate court. Section
A below will discuss the three major areas where practical limitations
undermine the CAVC’s reliance on precedential decisions to justify the
rebuttable presumption: availability, enforceability, and notice. Section
B will challenge the logic of denying class certification to a litigant based
on the theoretical possibility that they could obtain a precedential
appellate decision. The CAVC’s resistance to the class action device on
such grounds is simply incongruent with how other federal courts treat
putative class representatives.
A. Practical Challenges: Availability, Enforceability, and Notice
The rebuttable presumption begins with a flawed implicit
premise—that the alternative to receiving class certification is receiving
a precedential decision. Virtually all veterans who bring cases before
the CAVC receive unpublished decisions. The CAVC issues vanishingly
few precedential decisions—fewer than any other federal appellate
court.204 Panels only issue published, precedential decisions in six
percent of cases that proceed to a decision by the court.205 Single judges
decide the other ninety-four percent of cases and issue unpublished,
non-precedential decision.206 The CAVC is constrained in its ability to
hear cases before a panel and write published decisions because its
caseload is overwhelmingly high.207 In FY 2020, the CAVC averaged over
700 appeals filed per month—a caseload of over 1,300 filings per active
judge compared with an average of anywhere from 81 to 443 filings per
active judge in the federal circuit courts of appeal.208
Despite the issuance of the Monk II ruling issued in 2017, the CAVC
has still received relatively few requests for class certification.209 Due to
an increase in the number of final decisions adjudicated by the BVA each
204 Approximately eighty-seven percent of decisions in the federal circuit courts of
appeal are unpublished. Table B-12—U.S. Courts of Appeals Judicial Business, U.S. CTS.
(Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/b-12/judicial-business/
2019/09/30. The CAVC exceeds even the most unpublished circuit, the 11th Circuit, in
which 93.5% of decisions are unpublished. Id.
205 See CAVC 2020 REPORT, supra note 6, at 2 (showing that of 2,581 cases that
proceeded to a decision by the court, 2,433 were decided by a single judge).
206 Id.
207 Id. at 7–8 (“[E]ach active judge on the Court carries a substantial workload . . . .
Congress recently renewed the Court’s temporary authority for nine active judges. The
Court’s current workload justifies making the temporary expansion to nine judges
permanent.”).
208 Id.
209 See id. at 7 (noting that, in FY 2020, “the Court received four requests for class
certification and class action, and certified two classes”).
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year, the court’s caseload has risen dramatically.210 Given the current
caseload trends, it seems the odds are low for more individual veterans
to obtain precedential decisions without some sort of drastic increase in
the number of active judges on the court.211 Increased use of the class
action still stands as one of the best avenues for the CAVC to “increase[e]
its prospects for precedential opinions.”212
The VA also frequently dodges the effects of precedential decisions
that could be issued. When veterans’ cases are scheduled for a panel
review, the VA often avoids a binding precedential decision by mooting
the individual case.213 This tactic becomes unavailable to the VA in class
actions because mooting the individual claim of the class representative
does not moot the class claims.214 After Conley Monk appealed his case
to the Federal Circuit in Monk II, but before a decision had been reached,
the VA granted him a 100% disability rating and then argued to the
Federal Circuit that the appeal of class certification was moot.215 The
Federal Circuit summarily rejected that argument and explicitly held
that a class action claim does not become moot even if the VA resolves
the class representative’s claim, so long as “‘other persons similarly
situated will continue to be subject to the challenged conduct.’”216
Even when a binding precedential decision is issued to an
individual veteran, it is by no means guaranteed that the VA will adhere
to the decision and grant all other veterans the benefits of a favorable
decision, thereby saving them the burden of litigating the issue
themselves. In Staab v. McDonald, the CAVC held that the VA had been
wrongly interpreting and applying 38 U.S.C. § 1725 by denying claims
for the reimbursement of non-VA emergency medical costs where the
veteran had any form of outside health insurance that might potentially
cover those costs.217 The court “definitively and unambiguously” struck
Id.
See CAVC 2020 REPORT, supra note 6, at 7 (“These numbers are the highest in the
30-year history of the Court.”).
212 Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
213 Young v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 201, 215 (2012) (en banc) (Lance, J., dissenting)
(“[The CAVC] regularly orders the Secretary to respond to a [mandamus petition] . . . .
When the Court issues such an order, the great majority of the time the Secretary
responds by correcting the problem within the short time allotted for a response, and
the petition is dismissed as moot.”); see also Monk, 855 F.3d at 1321 (recognizing that
the VA intentionally moots petitions for writs of mandamus before the CAVC can review
them).
214 U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980).
215 Monk, 855 F.3d at 1316.
216 Id. at 1317 (quoting Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 76 (2013)).
217 Wolfe v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 1, 11 (2019); Staab v. McDonald, 28 Vet. App. 50, 55
(2016).
210
211
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down the VA’s interpretation of the statute and instructed the VA not to
exclude veterans with private medical insurance from potential
reimbursement.218 The VA responded by crafting a new regulation that
excluded “nearly every type of expense a veteran could have incurred”
and created a scheme that was “indistinguishable from the world Staab
authoritatively held impermissible under the statute.”219 When a putative
class representative brought another challenge to the VA’s actions in
Wolfe v. Wilkie, the court recognized that—despite having the benefit of
a precedential decision that indisputably held the VA’s actions to be
unlawful—the only recourse individual claimants had in the face of such
intransigence on the part of the VA was “[f]ull exhaustion of the agency
review process, followed by an appeal to [the CAVC].”220 Individual
litigants do not have any way of enforcing the VA’s violation of a
precedential decision issued to another veteran other than spending
years litigating the issue up to the CAVC themselves, whereas a member
of a class who is successfully awarded relief and “suffers VA’s
noncompliance” can enforce the class judgment with the VA being
subject to contempt for non-compliance.221
Veterans need the enforcement mechanisms that accompany class
judgments because the VA has repeatedly shown itself to be far more
intransigent than the CAVC would like to believe.222 The VA simply
defied the holding of the precedential decision issued to a single litigant
in Staab until the enforcement mechanisms of a class action were
brought to bear in Wolfe.223 The Nehmer class, who entered into a
consent decree with the VA pursuant to a pre-VJRA class action, has had
to bring four separate enforcement motions in district court over the
last twenty-nine years to enforce the VA’s adherence to the
Wolfe, 32 Vet. App. at 11.
Id.
220 Id. at 33.
221 Id.; see also Skaar v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 156, 198 (2019) (“[C]laimants not party
to [a precedential decision] who may be subject to errors affecting their rights, whether
due to VA’s non-compliance with our decision at a later date or otherwise, do not have
any right to prompt remedial enforcement.”); Monk v. Wilkie, 30 Vet. App. 167, 200
(2018) (Allen, J., concurring in part) (“[A] precedential decision does not give a person
who is not a party to that case a right to enforce a decision without instituting a separate
action. If that person were a certified class member, however, he or she would have an
enforceable right subject to contempt.”), aff’d, No. 2019-1094, 2020 WL 6141013 (Fed.
Cir. Oct. 20, 2020).
222 See Bowling v. McDonough, No. 18-5263, 2021 U.S. App. Vet. Claims. LEXIS 513, at
*16 (Mar. 29, 2021) (characterizing VA non-compliance as “hypothetical” and
“unlikely”).
223 See Wolfe v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 11 (2019) (recognizing that the VA responded to
Staab by creating a regulation which the CAVC had already “authoritatively held
impermissible”).
218
219
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settlement.224 The Ninth Circuit, in ruling on an appeal taken from the
district court’s decision on one of those motions, remarked that “[w]hat
is difficult for us to comprehend is why the Department of Veteran
Affairs, having entered into a settlement agreement and agreed to a
consent order . . . continues to resist its implementation so
vigorously.”225 Veterans need the robust enforcement mechanisms that
accompany a class action to overcome this type of “obstructionist
bureaucratic opposition” by the VA.226
Additionally, when a precedential decision is issued in an
individual case, there is no obligation on the part of the VA to notify
other veterans who might benefit from that decision.227 The VA’s
actions—like those at issue in Wolfe—further complicate notice of
precedential decisions. There, not only did the VA explicitly adopt a
regulation that was directly contrary to the binding precedent of the
CAVC, but it also began “affirmatively informing veterans” that they
were not eligible for the medical coverage that the court had decided
they were eligible for—”[i]n other words, the Agency was telling
veterans that the law was exactly opposite to what a Federal court had
held the law to be.”228 The court recognized that many veterans might
have elected not even to pursue appeals of adverse decisions on the
issue based on the VA’s misrepresentations of the precedential decision
in Staab.229
Clearly, a precedential decision issued to a single veteran does little
to benefit similarly situated veterans if the VA refuses to abide by it and
misinforms veterans regarding the effect of that decision. Further, many
of the unrepresented veterans who litigate claims through the system
lack the time, resources, research skills, or legal knowledge to locate or
even understand the significance of precedential decisions that are
beneficial to them.230 One of the factors that motivated the court to
224 See Nehmer v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. C 86-06160 WHA, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 207458, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2020) (“On three separate occasions (four
including this motion), they have had to seek enforcement of the consent decree on a
class-wide basis. Each time, Judge Henderson interpreted the consent decree in
plaintiffs’ favor and granted the requested relief.”).
225 Nehmer v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 494 F.3d 846, 864 (9th Cir. 2007).
226 See id. at 865.
227 See Hagel & Horan, supra note 53, at 65 (“[T]he VA is under no duty to identify
those veterans and make them whole. It is, rather, up to the individual veteran to
discover the court’s precedent and ask for a readjudication of his or her case based upon
that decision and a claim of clear and unmistakable error.”).
228 Wolfe, 32 Vet. App. at 12.
229 Id.
230 See Brief for Am. Legion et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 16, Monk v.
Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (No. 15-7092), 2015 WL 8485189); see also
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grant class certification in Beaudette was the belief that, because of the
highly unique circumstances of the case, affected claimants “would be
left to discover [a precedential] opinion through extraordinary diligence
or by chance.”231 That is the situation that faces countless veterans due
to the systemic lack of representation and inadequate notice of the effect
of precedential decisions. The CAVC’s presumption against the
certification of class actions is simply not supported by the reality of the
practical challenges facing veteran litigants in obtaining and enforcing
precedential decisions.
B. The Logical Inconsistency of the Presumption Against Class
Actions
Requiring litigants to overcome a presumption against certifying
class actions based on the mere possibility that they could individually
obtain a precedential decision is not consistent with how other federal
courts view class actions.232
Theoretically, any putative class
representative could instead litigate their individual claims in the trial
court. If they were to win, their case would be, at minimum, persuasive
precedent for other similarly situated plaintiffs. And if they were to lose,
they could appeal their claim to an appellate court and could potentially
obtain a binding, precedential decision that would benefit other
plaintiffs within that appellate court’s jurisdiction.
But the class action device serves a vital role in our legal system
beyond simply functioning as a slightly more efficient route for multiple
litigants to obtain decisions that they could just as easily seek
individually. The fact that the class representative obtains a judgment
for themselves is more properly viewed as merely a “byproduct[] of the
class-action device.”233 The class representative has a “right” to step up
and serve as a “private attorney general” to protect the rights of absent
Veterans’ Disability Compensation: Forging a Path Forward: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Veterans’ Affairs, 111th Cong. 35–36 (2009) (statement of Prof. Michael P. Allen)
(“[T]he current system of judicial review has built into it a serious risk of prejudice to
veterans . . . . [leaving] particularly those unrepresented at the filing of a judicial appeal,
at risk of running afoul of rules designed to implement an adversarial system.”).
231 Beaudette v. McDonough, No. 20-4961, 2021 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 671, at
*23 (Apr. 19, 2021).
232 See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 403 (1980) (“[T]he Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure give the proposed class representative the right to have a class
certified if the requirements of the Rules are met.”); see also Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d
94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968) (“[I]f there is to be an error made, let it be in favor and not against
the maintenance of the class action . . . .”).
233 See Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 403 (“Although the named representative receives
certain benefits from the class nature of the action, some of which are regarded as
desirable and others as less so, these benefits generally are byproducts of the classaction device.”).
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and unrepresented parties and prevent them from having to come
before the court themselves to enforce already-issued precedential
judgments.234
The class action exists to correct the type of problem that plagues
veterans benefits adjudication—a “large number of actions,” each of
which has “common question[s]” that are disputed over and over again
through a “process of a practical smothering of repeated suits” which
“take some time and [do] not always operate fairly.”235 Class actions
promote access to justice by allowing for the collective resolution of
claims where veterans cannot effectively bring claims and enforce
judgments as individuals.236 The development of CAVC class action
jurisprudence from Harrison and Lefkowitz through Monk II and Skaar
has been the slow recognition that class actions are, in many ways,
“superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy” when compared to the challenges that
face veterans in taking advantage of the vanishingly small number of
precedential decisions to come out of the CAVC.237 Veterans should not
have to repeatedly make this case on their own by overcoming the
rebuttable presumption in every potential class action. And the CAVC
should not continue to assume that their precedential decisions are
being scrupulously adhered to by the VA and taken advantage of by all
similarly situated veterans. Rather, the CAVC should align itself with the
rest of the federal judiciary and recognize that a potential class claimant
has “the right to have a class certified” if they meet the requirements of
Rule 23.238
V. CONCLUSION
The CAVC should eliminate the presumption against the
certification of class actions that is now codified in U.S. Vet. App. Rule
22(a)(3). The court’s newly adopted U.S. Vet. App. Rule 23 already
captures the long-standing prerequisites of numerosity, commonality,
typicality, adequacy of class representatives and counsel, and
availability of appropriate relief drawn from Rule 23, whose adoption
by the court Judge Allen rightly commended as wise.239 The

Id. at 402–03.
See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, in THE THOMAS M. COOLEY LECTURES,
SECOND SERIES 152–53 (1949).
236 See Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 1649.
237 See Skaar v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 156, 172 (2019).
238 See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 403 (1980).
239 Monk v. Wilkie, 30 Vet. App. 167, 188 (2018), aff’d, No. 2019-1094, 2020 WL
6141013 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 20, 2020) (Allen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234
235
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presumption against class action certification is based on the faulty
assumption that veterans can come to the CAVC and obtain binding,
enforceable precedential decisions that spur the VA to correct its errors
and fulfill its mission to “care for [those] who shall have borne the
battle.”240 Sadly, that is simply not the reality for the vast majority of
veterans. Rather than place another hurdle in veterans’ path to
obtaining benefits, the CAVC should abandon the presumption against
the certification of class actions.

240 Mission, Vision, Core Values & Goals, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., https://www.va.
gov/about_va/mission.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).

